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Acquisition programs have inherent variability in their task durations, which often 
results in unforecasted completion delay.  Using concepts from Lean Production and Lean 
Product Development, queues that are at the heart of these delays can be made visible and 
can be managed.  Observing queues in acquisition programs can give early warning of 
project problems.  Several techniques can be used to manage queues. 
Keywords: Queues, queueing theory, acquisition, product development, lean 
product development, cost of delay, utilization 
Introduction 
This paper is intended to be an introduction to a portion of a large subject.  
Conferences, scores of books, hundreds of papers, and uncounted consultants have been 
devoted to product development in the public and private sectors.  Issues such as 
configuration management tools, quality of the IMS (Integrated Management Schedule), 
domain-specific considerations, and people management—all important issues—will not be 
treated here.  This paper focuses on a topic that may not be as well known as other product 
development topics, but I believe has great potential to better manage acquisition programs. 
Queues are generally unrecognized entities in acquisition programs, yet they are 
valuable information sources and useful handles for controlling them.  Lean manufacturing 
experts have long viewed queues as near-evils to be managed in a production environment, 
but only relatively recently have they viewed them as either problems or opportunities in 
product development.  There is now a rich literature on lean production (Ohno, 2008) and 
lean product development (Morgan & Liker, 2006) that relies on insights gained from 
queueing theory.  
Queues are easy to recognize in a production environment—piles of physical product 
in front of a workstation or machine make them obvious.  What is a queue in acquisition, 
where the thing being manufactured, at least in the early stages, is only information?  In this 
paper, I take the point of view of the Program Manager (PM) or PM leadership and focus on 





Recognizing a Queue 
Figure 1 shows 
a project overview.   
The top line shows how 
many tasks have been 
started since the 
beginning of the project 
as of the date on the x 
axis.  The bottom line 
shows how many tasks 
have been finished 
since beginning of the 
project as of the date 
on the x axis. Thus, in 
period 13, there are 15 
projects that have been 
started since the 
beginning and 10 
projects that have been 
finished since the 
beginning, leaving 5 
projects in the queue. 
Figure 1. Where is the Queue? 
Queues arise whenever there are unfinished tasks.  Thus, some amount of queueing 
is inevitable.  In the figure, the only points where the lines meet (where the queue has 
disappeared) are at the beginning and at the end.  However, when the number of unfinished 
tasks is large, queues are large.  In the figure, the gap between cumulative started and 
cumulative finished tasks is the queue size.  Note that both the vertical (quantity) and 
horizontal gaps (time) grow for increasing queues. The key fact to note is that queue size 
will increase well before the task completion dates prove that the schedule is slipping.  Thus, 
queue size is a leading indicator of schedule slips. 
This graph can be created using the program management tool to create a scatter 
plot of numbered task actual start dates and actual finish dates, sorted by actual start date. 
In the graph, there are a few points where the queues are dramatically reduced.  
This occurs when the cumulative complete line jumps up after going horizontal for some 
time (approximately periods 8, 17, and 24).  These points correspond to authorization points 
such as milestone decisions.  Here the queue arises not only because it takes some time to 
complete several tasks—in synchrony—but also because the milestone meeting may not 
occur immediately after the tasks are complete.  The milestone decision meeting may be 
delayed.  While teams will not completely stop work while they wait for the milestone 
decision, the milestone decision may render speculative work irrelevant. 
What Makes Queues Large? 
The factors that make queues larger are longer task durations, the number of tasks 
being worked on simultaneously, waiting for completion of other dependent tasks, and 




breaking down tasks into small-enough chunks, multi-tasking key people (thus spreading 
them too thin), poor metrics that do not allow queues to be better managed, insufficient 
parallelization of tasks when staff is adequate to support more simultaneous tasks, and 
infrequent review meetings that increase team wait time. 
A pernicious kind of queue is created by rework.  Rework is usually not visible in 
common project management software.  In particularly risky acquisitions, where new 
science and engineering knowledge are being developed, rework is inevitable, and is 
sometimes represented as a finite number (i.e., a guess) of iterations of a set of tasks.  
Other reasons that rework occurs is when it is due to team directions that are either under- 
or over-specified, when testing is delayed, or when authorization reviews do not take place 
regularly. 
A more fundamental cause of large queues arises from the variable nature of work 
that dominates a typical acquisition.  Task durations can only be approximately estimated, 
and duration varies widely among different tasks.  Variability in both estimated and actual 
durations produces unexpected, non-obvious task duration (cycle time) increases, which in 
turn increases queues.  Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon The two curves result from two 
different values for coefficient of variation.  The more variation there is in task duration, the 
more that cycle time tends to “blow up” with increasing utilization. 
This phenomenon is well known to practitioners of lean production.  Their normal 
response, as opposed to the response of lean product development practitioners is to 
aggressively reduce variability.  This is often not an option in acquisitions that require 
knowledge work, such as science and engineering.  Variability is inherent in knowledge 
work, so other approaches must be used to make an impact on project cycle time and 
queues.  
How Do You Measure 
Queues? 
Unlike estimated 
schedule completion, queues are 
measured with actual data.  
Their size is the accumulated 
person-hours actually spent on 
started but unfinished tasks.  
This number can be calculated 
from most project management 
software if incurred person-hours 
are entered into the tool.   
 
Figure 2.  
Figure 3. C
Cycle Time versus Utilization 





Figure 4. Measuring Queues from IMS 
Above is a simple example taken from a typical IMS.  For simplicity, only two started-
but-unfinished tasks are shown, with 270 and 7 workdays invested in the two tasks.  
Workdays from any additional started-but-unfinished tasks would simply be added to 277.  
This value would be valid only on the day that this data is recorded.  By recording this data 
every week and graphing it, queue size and trends would become apparent.   
However, for very large programs, there may be scores of open tasks, and not very 
timely accounting for actual hours spent.  Lack of timely data entry defeats the purpose of 
providing early warning, but there is an easier way to providing nearly the same information.  
Tracking only workdays (without regard to how many people are working on each task) 
spent on started-but-unfinished tasks provides a good substitute.   
Figure 4 is a graph of queue task-periods for the graph shown in Figure 1.  In other 
words, they have been calculated for every period in the project rather than just one period 
as in Figure 3.  Figure 4 
shows the queue in period 13 
growing above the previous 
maximum.   This is early 
warning that work may not be 
completed as scheduled.  
While the cause may be long 
duration tasks and not late 
tasks, the graph provides 
triggers to ask questions about 
what is going on.  The height 
of the curve in Figure 4 
represents the area between 
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The beauty of this metric is that it can be calculated from PMO (Program 
Management Office) IMS data with little extra work.  In other words, no matter the size of the 
program, this metric is easily calculated and tracked. 
How Can We Reduce Queues? 
Three general measures can be taken to reduce queues: 
 Manage demand, 
 Increase capacity, and 
 Project management. 
Demand can be managed via requirements management.  Most requirements’ 
development processes bucket requirements into “must haves” versus “nice to haves.”  This 
can be expanded to ranking (possibly by dollarizing) requirements so that when a schedule 
slip with a given set  of requirements looks likely, there is a list of “nice to have” 
requirements that can be jettisoned in rank order.  The key is to rank order requirements.  
The program would then have a requirements relief valve.   
Increasing capacity will reduce utilization, thereby reducing queues and cycle time 
(see Figure 2).  Capacity can be increased by staff additions or staff adaptation—that is, 
intelligently and dynamically allocating staff.  Many programs assume that only IMS people 
do IMS, only acquisition people do acquisition planning, only manpower people do 
manpower planning, etc.  Using people with multiple domain capabilities can help increase 
utilization and decrease cycle time.  They can either be teams of senior people who move 
from function to function as problems crop up, or teams of junior people who may not need 
as much domain-specific knowledge to change function and still perform adequately in a 
reduced role.  These teams are sometimes called SWAT teams or tiger teams.  
Understanding queues gives the program manager extra tools.  First, as mentioned 
above, queues are a leading indicator of program health.  Second, developing expectations 
of where specific queues are likely to occur makes it possible to prevent them, not just fix 
them.  For example, task parallelization can be concentrated on the potentially longest 
(riskiest) queues, and efforts can be made to move these potential queues from the critical 
path.  Third, as mentioned in the paragraph above, SWAT-like teams can be constructed 
with the right skill sets for expected queues.  Fourth, with the right economic guidelines, 
which we will discuss next, the program manager can respond quickly to rapidly developing 
queue problems.  Finally, the program manager and his or her leadership can schedule 
reviews of the program both internally and externally on a frequent, regular basis (a 




Quick Response Based on Solid Economic Guidelines 
 Controlling queues means getting the right resources put on solving real-time design 
and planning problems.  This requires 
knowing what level of resources is 
reasonable to apply to the problem.  This 
can only be done well if tradeoff 
guidelines based on data are created at 
the beginning.   
Figure 5 shows these tradeoff 









and cost of delay 
3. Between development cost and cost of delay 
 
Figure 6. Economic Tradeoffs 
The most difficult metric to calculate is the cost of delay.  This is not often done in 
either government or private industry, since the cost of delay has a high subjective 
component.  Nonetheless, an intelligent guess, especially if there is buy-in at every level of 
leadership, is better than none at all.  For, if there is not even a guess, many decisions that 
may affect queues and cycle time—and thus the program being on schedule—may have to 
be made above the PMO or after the program slips.  Or to put it another way, having upfront 
guidelines to make these tradeoffs makes it possible to push many decisions down to the 
PMO’s teams where quick response at the most detailed level may help prevent schedule 
slips. 
An example of a tradeoff guideline is, “you are authorized to spend up to $100 to 
save $200 cost of delay, without asking for permission.”  One dollar value can be given to 
the PMO, who may give smaller limits to the teams below depending on the degree of 
oversight desired.  As Reinertsen has pointed out regarding product development (2009), 
this kind of guideline can become a core part of mission-type orders (Lind, 1985) to the 







Figure 7. Sample Economic Guidelines 
Summary 
Queues in acquisition are good leading indicators of future schedule slips.  Queues 
can be managed by ranking requirements, controlling task starts, staffing adaptively, setting 
up “SWAT teams” of acquisition experts, parallelizing tasks, reviewing cadences, and 
establishing guidelines for tradeoffs.  A list of references is provided to direct the reader to 
the latest writing I found on the subject. 
This publication contains general information only and Deloitte is not, by means of 
this publication, rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax, or 
other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such 
professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or 
action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any 
action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional 
advisor. Deloitte shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person who 
relies on this publication. 
About Deloitte 
As used in this document, “Deloitte” means Deloitte Consulting LLP, a subsidiary of 
Deloitte LLP.  Please see www.deloitte.com/us/about for a detailed description of the 
legal structure of Deloitte LLP and its subsidiaries. 
Copyright ©2010 Deloitte Development LLC.  All rights reserved 
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